应用经济学报告系列 (1112-4)

题目：Fishy Gifts: Bribing with Shame and Guilt
报告人：David Ong (HSBC)
时间：4:00-5:30pm, September 28
地点：成人直播新楼216教室

Abstract:
Gifts are often used where the institutions of contracting do not exist, or are underdeveloped, as in emerging markets, or otherwise unenforceable, as with illicit transactions in developed markets. Studies of guilt based reciprocity have shown how receivers beliefs’ about senders beliefs’ alone can influence reciprocation of a gift in one shot situations, even when reciprocation was unobservable, and hence, unenforceable. Studies of shame based reciprocity have shown how the mere anticipation of being possibly observed not reciprocating by a passive audience can increase reciprocation. But, to my knowledge, there is no study of how the shame of accepting a gift may interact with the guilt of not reciprocating. In the following psychological game with incomplete information, I show that if recipients are heterogeneously shame and guilt averse, the beliefs implied by a gift can induce a self-fulfilling reputation through their interaction. In particular, I show how a bribing firm, by varying the saliency of the expectation for reciprocation, through cheap talk announcements, or by varying the value of the gift, can induce non-reciprocating recipients to reject and thus, reduce costs. In cases when the shame of accepting a possible bribe is too great, I show how the same actions can invite free-riders to accept, and thus, reduce the shame of those who would reciprocate into accepting. The model was inspired by the gift giving practices of pharmaceutical firms to doctors. I explain a perverse consequence of current policies to prevent reciprocation, and why the most obvious solution, a ban on gifts, has been adopted only by a handful of hospitals. I discuss implications for professional services where reciprocation is a credence good and hence, also unobservable.