报告1：Cash Holding Adjustments and Firm Entrenchment

报告人：Zhan Jiang (SUNY-Buffalo)

时间：2011年2月19日（周六）9:00-10:20am

地点：成人直播新楼216教室

摘要：We find that, on average, firms close 36% of their gaps between target and actual cash ratios in each year. As firms become more entrenched, they decelerate their cash adjustment significantly, but only if the actual cash ratio exceeds the target ratio. We interpret this as evidence that self-interested managers are reluctant to disburse excess cash, and will allow cash levels to remain high unless they are subject to external pressure.

报告2：Limited Market Participation and Asset Prices in the Presence of Managerial Manipulation

报告人：Bo Sun (University of Virginia)

时间：2011年2月19日（周六）10:30-11:50am

地点：成人直播新楼216教室

摘要：We examine the role of managerial manipulation of financial results in explaining the properties of asset prices and stock market participation. We demonstrate that investors’ uncertainty about the extent of manipulation can cause excess movements in stock price relative to fluctuations in output. When faced with information asymmetry about fundamentals in the presence of earnings management, investors demand a higher equity premium for bearing the additional risk associated with their payoffs. In addition, when investors have heterogeneous beliefs about managerial manipulation, the dispersion in belief endogenously gives rise to limited stock market participation. Our model suggests that the increasing stringency of corporate governance and disclosure regulation and the varying composition of investors may have played a role in the contemporaneous run-up of market participation rates in the recent years.

欢迎感兴趣的老师参加！