Economics Seminar（2016-17）

Topic: Strategic Sequential Bidding for Government Land Auction Sales– Evidence from Singapore

Speaker: Jing Li, Singapore Management University

Time: Friday, November 18, 14:00-15:30

Place: Room 217, Guanghua Building 2

Abstract:

This paper studies the extent to which equilibrium auction prices are pushed up sequentially due to strategic bidding behaviors in government land auction sales. Using a unique dataset that covers the universe of tendering prices submitted by all developers for all residential land auction sales in Singapore, we find that a tenderer’s bids are significantly higher where there was a previous land parcel sold within two years and located within four kilometers. The elevated price margin decreases with time and geographic distance. Tracking sequential bids submitted by same developers over time, we find that the incumbent winner of a previous auction often participates in subsequent nearby land sales but does not necessarily win the sites. We argue that the incumbent deliberately bids up the subsequent land prices to gain pricing advantages to their own parcels.

Introduction:

Jing Li is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the Singapore Management University. She received a Ph.D. degree in Economics from Syracuse University in 2013. Her research specialties are Urban Economics, Health Economics, Real Estate Economics and Finance. Her research papers have been published in, among others, Regional Science and Urban Economics, Health Economics Review and Journal of Applied Econometrics.

//www.mysmu.edu/faculty/lijing/index.html

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