题目：Why and When Is Bailout Optimal? 报告人：Yunhong Yang (GuanghuaSchoolof Management, PKU)

时间：10月29日（周四）10:00-11:30am

地点：成人直播新楼216教室

摘要：This paper builds a dynamic framework to study the behavior of a typical commercial bank in financial crises. The bank’s financial structure has a feedback effect on its investment selection by limiting the bank’s business activity.When the invested project falls into trouble temporally,the bank will make choicesbetween takeover and liquidation of the project based on the optimal capital-asset ratio and the capital-asset ratio required by the regulatory authority, which will affect the bail-out policy of the government during the financial crises. Our main findings are: (1) When the required capital-asset ratio is low enough, bank will act independently on the troublesome project by optimizing its capital-asset ratio. Thus, it is much more efficient to allow the bank to tackle the troublesome project without the bailout policy. (2) When the required capital-asset ratio is too high for the bank to make its own decision to deal with the troublesome project, it is necessary for the government to launch a bailout program. (3) The bailout policy could target the project or the bank. It is optimal to bailout the bank directly because of the leverage advantages of the bank’s capital.